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Resumé
Le conseil épicurien d’éviter la participation politique a reçu maintes 
interprétations, souvent obscures et mal fondées. L’attitude apolitique ne peut être 
définie comme un simple manque d’intérêt ou de préoccupation pour la politique ; en 
effet, selon l’opinion de Pierre Hadot, la philosophie ancienne est profondément 
ancrée dans l’existence et les doctrines philosophiques n’acquièrent de l’importance 
que lorsqu’elles assistent le praxis. L’attitude d’Épicure est donc enracinée dans le 
refus de vivre selon des normes prescrites par l’établissement politique. Selon lui, la 
politique traditionnelle est vouée à l’échec puisqu’elle poursuit aveuglément le pouvoir 
et la richesse. En réaction à cette situation, Épicure crée une communauté qui 
instaure de nouvelles valeurs et au sein de laquelle il est possible de vivre 
conformément à ces nouvelles valeurs. Se situant en totale opposition aux modes de 
vie les plus fondamentaux de la cité, les adeptes d’Épicure, s’ils participaient à la vie 
politique, déclencheraient une grande hostilité de la part des partisans des valeurs 
traditionnelles. Pour cette raison, l’attitude épicurienne peut d’abord représenter une 
manière d’éviter la persécution politique. De plus, s’il est admis que la politique 
implique la poursuite du pouvoir, les épicuriens ne peuvent s’y adonner puisque cela 
serait contradictoire à leur quête d’ataraxie. À tous égards et indépendamment de ces 
deux motifs justifiant le retrait de la vie politique, il est clair que si l’attitude d’Épicure 
ne reposait pas sur une conscience politique, alors, ses critiques à l’égard de la vie 
politique, son désir de s’y soustraire et la création d’une communauté distincte 
n’auraient pas été. La politique a le pouvoir de profondément modeler la vie des 
gens. Considérant que ce conditionnement s’appuie sur des valeurs malsaines, le 
projet épicurien s’applique donc à remodeler, à la lumière de nouvelles valeurs, la vie 
de ceux qui ne trouvent aucune satisfaction à poursuivre la vie de la cité. 
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Abstract
Epicurus’ advice to avoid political participation has been the object of a number 
of confusing and sometimes ungrounded interpretations. Based on Pierre Hadot’s 
view that ancient philosophy was fundamentally rooted in existence, and that 
philosophical doctrines were only important insofar as they assisted a praxis, the 
apolitical attitude cannot be understood merely as a lack of interest and concern for 
politics. On the contrary, Epicurus’ attitude was rooted in a refusal to live the way of 
life prescribed by the political establishment.  For him, traditional politics failed at 
making the life of citizens better on account of their excessive lust for power and 
wealth. In response to this situation, Epicurus’ project was aimed at creating a 
community in which it was possible to develop new values and live by them.  Had the 
Epicurean community  participated politically, being in direct opposition to the most 
fundamental ways of life of the city, it would have involved a great deal of hostility 
from partisans of traditional values.  Thus, Epicurus’ attitude may be justified first as a 
means to avoid political persecution. Second, since politics implied a significant 
amount of struggle for power, its pursuit clearly went against the prescribed 
undisturbed life of Epicureanism. At any rate, regardless of these two motives to avoid 
political participation,  it is clear that if Epicurus’ attitude had not  been politically 
inspired  then his criticism of political life, his avoidance of  it, and the creation of an 
alternative community would have never taken place. Politics has the power of 
shaping the life of people in profound ways. Seeing how this conditioning was based 
on unhealthy values, Epicurus’ project, therefore,  was to reshape anew, under the 
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1. Introduction
The Epicurean advice not to participate in politics derives not from a doctrine but 
from a choice concerning a way of life. It has been a common tendency in academia 
to concentrate particularly on the doctrines of ancient philosophers without  
considering how practice has played an essential role in the development of the 
various ancient philosophical doctrines. It is after Hegel, as Heinrich Niehues-
Probsting  observes, that “the history of philosophy is reduced to the history of ideas: 
only the theoretical products of philosophers, not their biographies, are of importance 
for the history of philosophy.”1  Before this understanding became the standard way to 
understand philosophy , biographies had a strong influence in the history of 
philosophy for the life of the philosopher was believed to be “of exemplary character 
and was considered the verification of the doctrine.”2 Considering this, it is necessary 
to ask in which way was Epicurus’ attitude practical and beneficial. Under this 
perspective, even if Epicurus clearly advises not to practice politics, it is impossible to 
detach it from the political and practical context in which Epicurus lived. Was 
Epicurus’ position politically motivated? Did it have have political significance? 
Provided, as we will see, that Epicurus’ philosophy is motivated by an opposition to 
the way of life of the city, it cannot be claimed that its intentions are deprived of 
political depth and intent; on the contrary, his way of life  and philosophy are in fact a 
reaction against, and an alternative to, the fundamental but corrupted project of the 
1 Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting, "The modern reception of Cynicism: Diogenes in the Enlightenment," 
Hellenistic culture and society (1996): 330.
2  Niehues-Pröbsting, The Modern Reception of Cynicism: Diogenes in the Enlightenment: 330. 
traditional political endeavor of organizing a life within the city.  Clearly, Epicurus’ 
philosophy, being focused on the attainment of a good life, gathers its knowledge and 
ethical essence from living experience. Therefore, his advice concerning political 
participation is fundamentally rooted in living experience. 
Epicurus’ teaching as a whole is without doubt counter-cultural. By reducing 
existence to the atoms and the void and teaching that the gods have no interest in 
human affairs, the power of traditional religions must have certainly felt threatened, 
and this could have well been, as it was with Socrates, a strong-enough reason to 
bring Epicurus before the Athenian jury. Moreover, making the Garden available to all, 
including women, challenged the customs of the regime, which excluded the latter 
from attending school. These and other aspects of the Epicurean organization were in 
direct confrontation with the traditional Athenian way of life and customs, and could 
have been the reason for many to resent the Epicurean circle. It is precisely the 
avoidance of prosecution, at least in part, which prompts Epicurus to respect the laws 
and traditions of the city even if they are in disagreement with Epicurean principles. 
On the other hand, the Epicurean life directly confronts the traditional Platonic and 
Aristotelian position which considered participation in politics as essential to human 
improvement. The pursuit of power and fame, typically associated with the practice of 
politics, does not provide true and lasting happiness; on the contrary, its major 
production is the enmity of those who take part in the race for power and recognition, 
and the enforced cultivation of the dishonesty necessary to gain the favors of others. 
For Epicurus, the best way to achieve lasting happiness is that which is acquired 
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through the philosophical life in the company of friends. If the regime of the city, 
because of the values it promotes, is unable to produce those things which for the 
Epicureans are considered essential to the happy life (i.e., ataraxia, friendship, 
justice) then the Epicurean life, being above all a way of life, must be seen as an 
alternative to the life proposed by the traditional political establishment, and in 
consequence one with tremendous political implications. 
Considering the above-mentioned, I will begin this project by determining what is 
precisely meant when we speak of philosophy as a way of life. The view that ancient 
philosophy needs to be understood primarily as necessarily  involving a kind of 
existential choice or commitment to a specific way of living one’s entire life was 
proposed by Pierre Hadot, particularly in his work What is Ancient Philosophy. To do 
this, I will focus on two aspects of Hadot’s teaching. First, I will do an overview of his 
position regarding philosophical discourse and its relation to practice in ancient 
philosophy. Second, I will refer to Hadot’s understanding of  philosophy as a way of 
life.  I expect that these two fundamental aspects characteristic of ancient philosophy 
will open the way for a more in-depth analysis of Epicurus’ attitude and its relationship  
to Epicurean practice. As we will see, ancient philosophy, starting with Socrates, was 
concerned with the formation of students.  The development of any theoretical system 
was, consequently,  a means to justify and help the student live according to the 
different precepts of each school. Seen this way, we need to study how we place the 
attitude in question and see how is it a means to attain Epicurean happiness. Next, I 
will make a review of the different theoretical principles that guided the school and 
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discuss how they were of assistance to those who attended the Garden.  I will also 
consider some aspects of the School and argue how it was conceived to be a 
veritable alternative to the communal life of the city. After this, I will  discuss  
Epicurus’ apolitical attitude in its textual context and argue that the evidence allows us 
to understand Epicurus’ position as an advice to avoid unsafe situations within the 
city, as well as a preferable practice to the attainment of ataraxy. 
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2. Philosophical discourse as an ethical tool in Hadot.
Hadot’s effort is devoted to reconciling philosophy with its practical aspect. To do 
this, he undertakes a general analysis of ancient philosophy and the core role of its 
concern with ethics above any other. For the most part, he argues, the representation 
we make of ancient philosophy today is mainly concerned with the systems 
developed  by philosophers and excludes the spiritual or existential aspect which 
made them important. Because of the demands of university education, students “get 
the impression that all the philosophers they study strove in turn to invent, each in an 
original way, a new construction, systematic and abstract, intended to explain the 
universe.”3 The theories of these philosophers, ancient and contemporary, give rise to 
“doctrines and criticisms of morality” which propose a number of consequences of the 
general principles of the system, which invites people to make choices on a particular 
model of life. The problem, says Hadot, is that the question of “whether this choice of 
life will be efficacious is utterly secondary and accessory; it doesn’t enter into the 
perspective of the philosophical discourse.”4 Therefore, if we undertake the study of 
ancient philosophy, the question of the efficacy of the set of principles developed by a 
given philosopher or school  is certainly more important than the question that solely 
deals with the logical rigour and a priori concerns of these systems. 
3 Pierre Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). 2.
4 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 2. 
This does not mean that the productions and all the concepts developed in 
antiquity lack importance. This is clearly not the conclusion of Hadot, for whom there 
can be no question of “the extraordinary ability of the ancient philosophers to develop 
theoretical reflection on the most subtle problems of the theory of knowledge, logic, or 
physics.” 5 However, because of the modern tendency to consider philosophy as only 
that which is doctrinal and theoretical, it is necessary to situate this theoretical 
production “within a perspective which is different from that which corresponds to the 
idea people usually have of philosophy.”6 
Philosophical discourse, therefore, needs to be understood from a wider 
perspective in which a choice of life and a particular way of seeing the world is what 
determines its form. Put differently, it is the choice that is made which determines the 
type of doctrine that is produced and the way it is taught, not the other way around. In 
addition, these choices are never made in solitude, as Hadot points out: “there can 
never be a philosophy or philosophers outside a group, a community - in a word, a 
philosophical school.”7 The latter was the means by which those who decided upon a 
certain way of life could have the necessary environment and stimuli to be able to 
actually give themselves fully to all the demands their choice implied. The culmination 
of such a practice would be the “desire to be and to live in a certain way.”8 It followed 
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5 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 3. 
6 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 3. 
7 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 3. 
8 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 3. 
that once a choice and its application were undertaken, philosophical discourse was 
used to “reveal and rationally justify this existential option.” Theoretical development, 
therefore, was secondary to the ethical goal of each particular choice of life. 
Starting with Plato, clearly under the influence of the Socratic figure, and 
followed by all the philosophies of antiquity, “all shared the aim of establishing an 
intimate link between philosophical discourse and way of life.”9 From the perspective 
of a modern student of philosophy, he or she would be expected to be familiar with 
the ideas of a particular philosophical set of doctrines. It is chance that decides 
whether or not, with time, the student finds a “professor who belongs to some 
particular ‘school’” to which perhaps the student will swear allegiance. However, the 
student’s engagement to the particular “ism” he or she has decided to follow only 
implies “intellectual allegiance and will not engage his way of life.”10 This, however, 
was certainly not the case for the ancients. Hadot brings an interesting example of 
how adhesion to a particular philosophy meant a total engagement of the student’s 
life. Polemo, after a night of debauchery, and as a result of a dare with his drunken 
friends, entered one of Xenocrates’ lectures and instantly decided to adopt the 
Platonic way of life; eventually he would become the head of the Academy.11 For 
ancient philosophers, the relation between philosophy as a way of life and 
philosophical discourse was so intimate that often those who limited themselves 
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9 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 55.
10 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 98.
11 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 98. 
exclusively to the discursive aspect of philosophy, putting aside its practical part, were 
bitterly criticized. This is, most certainly, one of the reasons that must have prompted 
Epicurus  to say that “one must not pretend to philosophize, but philosophize in 
reality. For we do not need the semblance of health but true health.”12 Hadot, to the 
same effect, cites Seneca’s critique of philosophers who turn “love of wisdom 
(philosophia)  into love of words (philologia).” 13
For Hadot, therefore, philosophical discourse is the result of a certain practice 
whose intention is to justify and explain an existential choice to others.  It enables 
philosophical practice in so far as it justifies it theoretically. One’s choice of life may be 
nourished greatly from philosophical reflection which is best expressed in theoretical 
form. Clearly each choice of life will present its own challenges which will demand of 
the philosopher a certain degree of reflection on how to confront them.  Two more 
functions, however, are also identified. Being the expression of an existential choice 
which requires that one perform actions on oneself and on others, it is an 
“indispensable means.”14 Because a philosophical choice requires the assistance of 
specific spiritual exercises, philosophical discourses are used as a means to help in 
the formation of those who partake in it “as dialogue with others or with oneself.” 
9
12 Epicurus, The Epicurus reader : selected writings and testimonia, trans. Brad Inwood and Lloyd P. 
Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994). Vatican Doctrines 54.
13 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 174.
14 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 175.
These three distinctive features make of  philosophical discourse something 
profoundly related to  living experience based on a particular choice. Philosophical 
discourse, being the expression of a way of life, assists in building the rational 
backbone of a particular option. Whether it is “the choice of the good, as in [Plato] or 
the choice of pure pleasure, as for the Epicureans” it will be “necessary to disengage 
the presuppositions, implications, and consequences of each respective attitude with 
great precision.”15 Having to ask the question about what is the place of man with 
relation to the world, a physics will be developed. When it comes to the relation with 
one's fellow men, an ethics will appear. Each particular attitude by its nature comes 
loaded with a number of questions which will require, in the case of ancient 
philosophers,  strong rational argument. Furthermore, the philosophical discourses of 
the ancients also function as a transformative tool. Their intention is also “formative, 
educative, psychagogic, and therapeutic.” Perhaps this can be compared to the 
power of influence that the works of the different arts usually have on people. By 
means of their aesthetics, they stir individuals to act in specific ways, to a point that, 
in some cases, certain arts need to be banned when they fall afoul of the authorities 
of a given regime; this is clearly reminiscent of one of the distinctive features of 
Plato’s ideal regime depicted in the Republic, in which the banning of certain poets is 
recommended. In the case of philosophical discourses, their efficacy lies not only with 
the power of their aesthetics, but also with the power of their rationality. It was this 
distinctive feature which distinguished philosophy from something like religion. By 
basing their discourses on strong logical, valid and sound arguments, these 
10
15 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?:175.
philosophers believed to be able to heal the soul of those who listened to them. It was 
with words of reason that their ethical and therapeutic goal was in part accomplished.  
The first four of the Principle Opinions  of Epicurean philosophy also known as the 
Epicurean  tetrapharmakos, are a clear example of how philosophical discourse is 
employed as formative and therapeutic means. And it is because each school had as 
its mission the shaping of their students’ characters by means of rational reflection 
that discourse was a vital tool for each of them. But the rational nonetheless had its 
limitation, for again, the formative and therapeutical goals were more important. 
Dialogue, therefore, was not used merely to make people more knowledgeable about 
things but “to make people better dialecticians”, meaning that the point of learning 
how to dialogue went beyond being skillful at pointing errors in reasoning.  It meant 
“recognizing the presence and the rights of one’s interlocutor, basing one’s replies on 
what the interlocutor admits he knows, and therefore agreeing with him at each stage 
of the discussion.”16 Again, philosophical discourse  was intended to help the 
members of a particular school share and improve their experience of their own 
particular way of life. It allowed them to clarify and simplify the rational aspect of their 
choice of life and, by means of dialogue, it allowed these choices to be understood in 
the context of each student’s life. For instance, this clear in the case of the Epicurean 
school, where in combination with an emphasis on friendship, dialogue was used 
particularly with the intention of mutual correction.17
11
16 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 178.
17 Martha Craven Nussbaum, The therapy of desire : theory and practice in Hellenistic ethics  
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). 132-35. 
Philosophical discourse, therefore, needs to be understood not as something 
immobile or fixed but as something that acquired its form in the heart of human 
experience and in the context of a community, for the sake of guiding and curing the 
soul of people. Now  we should examine Hadot’s position concerning the concept of 
philosophy as a way of life. We should make a general account of his position so that 
we can move forward in our study concerning Epicurus’ apolitical attitude. 
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2.1 Philosophy as a way of life
The idea that ancient philosophy was above all a way of life that engaged the 
totality of the lives of those who practiced it is not new. Kant encapsulates this attitude 
in the following passage:
“The ancient Greek philosophers, such as Epicurus, Zeno, and Socrates, 
remained more faithful to the Idea of the philosopher than their modern counterparts 
have done. ‘When will you finally begin to live virtuously?’ said Plato to an old man 
who told him he was attending classes on virtue. The point is not always to speculate, 
but also ultimately to think about applying our knowledge. Today, however, he who 
lives in conformity with what he teaches is taken for a dreamer.” 18
In a similar way Nietzsche also remarks on the modern tendency to reduce 
philosophy to its academic and theoretic aspects. Thus in Twilight of the Idols 
Nietzsche accuses philosophers for turning everything into a concept:  “All that 
philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies; nothing 
actual has escaped from their hands alive. They kill, they stuff, when they worship, 
these conceptual idolaters - they become a mortal danger to everything when they 
worship.”19 And when he refers to ancient philosophical schools, he tells us that as far 
as praxis is concerned, he views them as “experimental laboratories in which a 
18 Kant in Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?. (Quoted before the introduction): xiii
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Twilight of the Idols " in The Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ: or 
How to Philosophize with a Hammer (England: Penguin Classics), 16.
considerable number of recipes for the art of living have been thoroughly practiced 
and lived to the hilt. The results of all the schools and of all their experiments belong 
legitimately to us.”20 Hence, for Nietzsche, the “art of living” and philosophy were 
clearly intimately related, practice and experimentation had supremacy over the value 
of concepts. 
Thus, Kant and Nietzsche were aware that during antiquity philosophy as a 
practice was more important than philosophy as exclusive theoretical discourse. And 
they also favored this distinction, for in their philosophies the ethical aspect of life 
cannot be separated from philosophical speculation. 
For Hadot, Socrates set the example for a new understanding of philosophy. It 
was with him that the problem of “knowing this or that” passed to a second plane, and 
rather, the question of “being in this or that way” became more important.21  This 
attitude was in opposition to the sophist claim that knowledge could be transferable 
as though it was a prefabricated object. In the case of Socrates, who claimed that he 
only  knew that he knew nothing, knowledge could not be transferable. If there was 
knowledge, it had to be rediscovered by the interlocutor himself, and that is why, 
according to Hadot, Socrates limited himself to asking questions that brought his 
interlocutors “to examine and become aware of themselves.”22 It is in this light that in 
14
20 Nietzsche, Posthumous Fragments, Autumn 1881, 59 in Michael Ure, Nietzsche's therapy : self-
cultivation in the middle works  (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008). 25.
21 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 26.
22 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?. 28. 
the Apology Plato reports Socrates as having said that he was not interested in what 
most people commonly pursued, such as fame, power, status, or wealth, but rather, in 
pursuing that which could do the most good to each individual person: “by persuading 
you to be less concerned with what you have than with what you are so that you may 
make yourselves as excellent and as rational as possible.”23
Hence, with Socrates, the relationship between knowledge and being became 
the particular interest of the philosopher, who before, in the perspective of the sophist, 
was only to acquire know-how knowledge and sophia. Thanks to this new 
understanding the philosopher became that individual who was utterly concerned with 
being a better person and helping others to do likewise. At this point one has to ask if 
the tendency to look inward, to be concerned with the extremely complex question of 
who one is in this world, is born out of a feeling of dissatisfaction with the way life was 
organized in the city. In this sense, the Socratic attitude is a refusal of universal 
principles or truths that people like the sophists or most of Socrates’ interlocutors 
would claim to possess. Not only because truth is something that cannot be 
possessed, but also because only in so far as we pursue it can we benefit from it. And 
going after the truth, so far as Plato’s Socrates suggests, can only be done by 
exercising our most human capacities. This is precisely one of the things Plato 
discusses in his Apology when human wisdom is contrasted with divine wisdom. In 
this text, Socrates argues that he has not acquired his reputation for charging fees in 
15
23 Plato, Apology, trans. Harold North Fowler, vol. 1, Plato in twelve volumes (Harvard University 
Press). 36c. 
exchange for teaching virtue, but for using “human wisdom”  instead of “divine 
wisdom.” Thus Socrates states:
“Human wisdom, perhaps. It may be that I really possess this, while those whom 
I mentioned just now [sophists—those who teach wisdom] are wise with a wisdom 
more than human; else I cannot explain it, for I certainly do not possess it, and 
whoever says I do is lying and speaks to slander me.”24
To exercise human wisdom is to be aware of one’s ignorance and to make sure 
others are aware of it too. Such attitude clearly implies a refusal of the state of affairs 
in which, as we see in Plato’s dialogues, many things were arranged based on an 
inappropriate assignation of value. Wealth or fame, for instance, were pursued by 
most people, as Socrates argues, on grounds  which were proven to be inconsistent.  
However, it is not the questioning that matters most. As Hadot remarks, Socrates is 
important not only for “his interrogations and his irony, but above all by means of his 
way of being, by his way of life, and by his very being.”25 This attitude, as it will be 
later discussed, is present thoroughly in Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus was also 
extremely critical of the way of life of the city and considered that the blind pursuit of 
wealth or fame was among the greatest evils of culture. 
16
24 Plato, Apology,  20d-e 
25 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 28. 
The call to self-questioning implies a search for independence from the 
standards and paradigms that composed society. In other words, through self-
questioning the question of what has the most value and what does not follows 
necessarily. In the case of what has  the most value we are referred to that which is 
really under our control to know. To illustrate this, Hadot uses Socrates’ attitude 
towards death. In the Apology  Socrates asserts that it is pointless to fear death, for it 
is impossible to know anything about it: “no one knows whether death might not be 
the greatest of goods for man, but people fear it as if they were perfectly certain it is 
the greatest of evils.  Yet how could it be anything but the most shameful ignorance to 
think one knows what one does not know?”26  To act according to things of which one 
is ignorant is a great mistake. One ought not to fear death, for one does not know 
what death is; this fear should not be the grounds of any action. Instead, the only 
thing that should be considered when one acts is if one is acting justly or unjustly, and 
whether one’s “deeds are those of a good man or a bad one.”27 To know what is good 
and what is bad when one acts, therefore, is the only thing that should be of concern 
to us. And it is because of this ethical distinction that knowledge is of interest to 
ancient philosophers. Knowledge, as Hadot puts it, beginning with Socrates, is not 
concerned with concepts but with values. Socrates “does know nothing about the 
value which ought to be attributed to death, because it is not in his power.” 
17
26 Plato in Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 33. 
27 Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?: 33.
Nonetheless, “he does know the value of moral action and intention, for they do 
depend upon his choice, his decision and his engagement.”28
Self-questioning engenders an awareness of oneself, and by default, a 
reassessment of what is good and bad, which in turn will guide one’s way of life. This 
manner of doing philosophy clearly displayed a rejection of some or many aspects of 
political society and the way of life it promoted. For ancient philosophers, the only way 
to break free from all the suffering and injustice implied in the values commonly 
promoted was to change one’s way of life radically, by the treating of the passions. 
Political society, while natural to human beings, was agreed to be a further cause of 
individuals’ having deeply habituated, false beliefs concerning human nature, and 
concerning what is good for them to pursue and to avoid. Thus, Hadot remarks that 
for all philosophical schools, “mankind’s principal cause of suffering, disorder, and 
unconsciousness were the passions: that is unregulated desires and exaggerated 
fears.”29 Socrates’ mission was to help his fellow citizens act in the most rational way, 
making sure they could act according to their own discovered truth, which implied a 
radical modification of commonly held values. This is why Foucault, for instance,  
insists that  self-examination  and the ethics of care “can be a very strong structure of 
existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian system, 
18
28 Plato, Apology, 29a-b
29  Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a way of life : spiritual exercises from Socrates to Foucault, trans. 
Arnold I. Davidson (Oxford ; New York: Blackwell, 1995). 83.
with a disciplinary structure.”30 Self-examination imposes a deconstruction and 
reconsideration of the principles that guide life which, to begin with, are initially 
inculcated by society; self-examination, therefore, allows the exploration of new 
values and the reconsideration of old ones. Considered this way, philosophy was 
perceived as the best way to determine the best values by which one could live a life 
free of disturbance; it was this conception which gave philosophy its therapeutic 
essence. Ancient philosophies' main intention was to persuade people to change their 
value judgements so that they could be cured of their ills. However, in order to change 
our value judgments “we must make a radical choice to change our entire way of 
thinking and being. This choice is the choice of philosophy, and it is thanks to it that 
we may obtain inner tranquility and peace of mind.”31 Hence, each philosophy sought 
to find a remedy for the human worries, anguish, and misery brought about, “for the 
Cynics, by social constraints and conventions; for the Epicureans, by the quest for 
false pleasures; for the Stoics, by the pursuit of pleasure and egoistic self-interest; 
and for the skeptics, by false opinions.”32
As stated earlier, such transformation can only take place in the context of a 
philosophical community, and implies the constant practice of a number of spiritual 
exercises. Particularly in the case of the Hellenistic schools, a set of practices was put 
in place to help the student overcome old values and create new ones. For this 
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reason, techniques such as memorization, “confession” and constant self-
examination are implemented, to help the student in his self-transformation process. 
For example, it was a typical practice for both Epicureans and Stoics to memorize 
very short aphorisms, containing a particular truth coherent with the values of each 
school. Confession too, as we have it from Philodemus, was considered of the utmost 
importance as a means of correction.  All this was not possible without the guidance 
and mentoring of the schools' masters, who were living examples of the choices of life 
they themselves pursued, who also served as inspirers to pupils, and who knew how 
to develop learning strategies for the different type of students they had. Concerning 
this last point, M. Nussbaum makes an interesting argument by pointing out that the 
medical kind of ethics of the Hellenistic schools may be inclined “to adopt an 
asymmetrical model of the relationship between teacher and pupil, doctor and patient. 
Just as we do not expect a physical patient to be as well informed as the expert 
doctor about the diagnosis and treatments of her own disease, so too we do not 
expect the ethical pupil to be able to know her own situation as well as the teacher 
knows.”33  The teacher-pupil relationship cannot occur outside of the setting of a 
community, especially because in the case of Hellenistic schools, living 
philosophically meant the refusal of the type of life commonly pursued. Each school 
was in that way a setting where those who disagreed with the ways of life of the city 
could live with each other according to their own understandings of, say,  justice, 
friendship, economic distribution, etc. In the case of Epicurus’ school, for instance, a 
new understanding of justice, friendship, erotic love, were cultivated and lived. This 
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community would not have been possible without the presence of its master, 
Epicurus, the person who who was not only responsible for developing the principles 
and tenets that guided the Epicurean life, but also who incarnated it. 
It is clear that the understanding of philosophy as a way of life, which started 
with Socrates, is profoundly linked with a general discomfort towards the type of life 
promoted by the political establishment at the time. It is for this reason that 
philosophy, understood this way, cannot be separate from  community life, because 
the purpose of philosophy was first and foremost to develop a way of life in the 
company of like-minded individuals, that is, an alternative community  different from 
the one found in the city. In this respect, Nussbaum is right in stating that the 
Hellenistic schools developed “procedures and strategies that are aimed not only at 
individual efficacy, but also at the creation of a therapeutic community, a society set 
over against the existing society, with different norms and different priorities.”34 The 
main features of these communities, therefore, are their belief that sound and valid 
arguments with great intellectual coherence deliver the individual from the sufferings 
produced by the pursuits of regular life in the city; that the truths these arguments 
convey  require spiritual guidance and mentorship from a master, as well as the 
rigorous assistance of specific spiritual exercises. 
It is clear, after this discussion, that Kant and Nietzsche’s insistence on the 
importance the practical had for ancient philosophers is not to be taken lightly.  Hadot 
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certainly makes an extremely important point by further clarifying and unraveling the 
different aspects of ancient philosophy, particularly by describing how philosophical 
discourse was intrinsically  related to the practical, and how the practical was 
committed to a rational choice of whatever each school understood as the good. 
Furthermore, this new understanding makes clear that these different choices were 
made in the spirit of a refusal of the values of the political establishment, and that 
their aim was to create a counter-cultural community in which  human life could 
flourish. Having said this, we can now move on and see in which way the Epicurean 
school proposes an alternative way of life different from the type of life of the city. 
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3. Epicurean Philosophy: Theory and practice
Just like most schools of philosophy after Socrates,  Epicureanism was above all 
interested in ethics. Nonetheless, unlike Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Epicurus 
returns to Ionian philosophy, and thus integrates natural science into his system. 
Although the study of nature is primordial, its role is subordinate to  a moral end, 
namely the attainment of ataraxy (ἀταραξία), freedom from pain and anguish. The 
study of nature and particularly the reduction of causality to concrete physical causes 
permits the flourishing of an existential condition which is  free from fear of the gods. 
This condition is thus removed and it is replaced by a new one which sees the world 
as the product of its own activity and driven by the attainment of pleasure. The 
question of how we acquire not only pleasure, but the best pleasure, is therefore up to 
us and no one else’s. The fear of displeasing the gods is no longer tenable, and the 
new preoccupation is one which can be banished by one’s own personal efforts.  
Thus by introducing a rational calculus as the means to acquire the purest pleasure, it 
becomes evident that the most pleasurable life, the life of ataraxy, is within the grasp 
of each individual person here and now.
More precisely, Epicurean philosophy is to a large extent the assertion that 
happiness depends on a proper understanding of the nature of the world, an 
understanding that for most people is flawed because it is based on false opinions 
and vain desires. Equally important is the belief that it is society’s culture which 
inculcates and promotes those values and opinions. Just as Socrates remarked, 
people hold fame, material wealth and political power in great esteem, and make of 
them fundamental goals, mistakenly thinking that they will bring great happiness to 
their lives. For Epicurus, acquiring great wealth or fame or political power implies 
“enslavement to the masses or the powers that be”35 because the acquisition of it 
does not depend on us, but on those who facilitate them. By the same token, 
Epicurus also claims that most men tend to conceive the universe in an incorrect way, 
which often leads to the incorporation of metaphysical elements from which fear and 
anguish frequently spring. At the outset of Epicurean philosophy, therefore,  vain 
desires and false opinions are major points of attack because they are both 
responsible for bringing pain and disturbance to most people. Consequently, 
Epicurean ἀταραξία can only come about when such sources of distress are 
removed from the soul. And believing that for the most part they are promoted by 
culture (παιδεία), Epicurus asks for moral self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) and 
consequently a radical change in one’s way of life. One of the ways by which 
Epicurus enables a state of self-sufficiency is by focusing on a careful understanding 
of man and nature, and based on this approach he develops his philosophical 
system. 
 As Diogenes Laertius tells us, Epicurus’ philosophy is divided into three different 
parts, namely, “canonic, Physics, Ethics”,36 even though Epicureans “conjoin canonic 
with physics.”  The first  deals with the rules of investigation, Epicurean epistemology, 
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and the second with the physical world and the processes therein. Because Epicurus 
“exalted nature as a norm of truth” 37 it is understandable why these two branches 
conjoin: they are interrelated. 
The canonic part considers that the standards of truth are based on three 
criteria; namely, sensations, preconceptions, and feelings.38 Sensations are the 
evidence acquired by the five senses. They alone provide what we could call today 
the raw data which is processed to create concepts. They are devoid of reason and 
memory; they are not self-inflicted, have an external cause; they cannot be refuted 
nor accused of error; and they are all equally valid.39 Without these data it is 
impossible to make any claim to truth. In point of fact, even in the case of making 
inferences about unknown phenomena, we must use what these sensations provide 
as departure points for analogy. It is impossible to do without them, for even dreams, 
fantasies, or any of our notions  “are derived from perceptions, either by actual 
contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition.” It is important to add that in 
case of error, it is not the sensations which are wrong but the cogitation at which 
reason arrives. Lucretius makes this point very clear when he gives the example of a 
square tower viewed from a distance that gives the impression of  being round40 or 
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the case of a straight paddle that put underwater appears to be bent.41 In both cases 
the impression transmitted is correct, what is wrong is to pass judgement on them 
without proper verification. 
Preconceptions are the notions formed after repeated contact with an external 
object has occurred. Once we are capable of distinguishing its particular 
characteristics, we may assign it a term that whenever used will allow us at once to  
“think of its shape by an act of preconception.”42 Memory is therefore an important 
component of this criterion, for whenever it takes hold of a notion, it will help us define 
other objects as they appear. That is why it is so important that unclear sensations be 
tested before they are allowed to become notions. In the case of something that from 
the distance appears to be a tower, it is important to get closer to it before we can be 
sure it is a real tower . For Epicureans, this is an essential principle to keep in mind, 
for false opinions are mistakingly considered true when we rush to make notions out 
of unclear “data.” For this reason, a method for testing the veracity of our impressions 
is created: “something is true if it is subsequently confirmed or if it is not contradicted 
by evidence, and false if it is not subsequently confirmed or is contradicted by 
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evidence.”43 It is important to know that preconceptions are not “innate” ideas44 but 
derive from perception, which is why they are valid.45
Feelings, the third criterion of truth, are divided into pleasure and pain. It is by 
means of  them that the choice is made whether something is to be avoided or  
pursued.46  And even though the validity of perceptions does not rest upon them, they 
greatly determine our conduct and morality. As mentioned before, it is the pursuit of 
vain pleasures and belief in false opinions that often create major dis-eases in the 
soul. This is why being able to read the “levels” of pleasure and pain is essential for 
the discernment of what is to be chosen or rejected when it comes to moral choices. 
So what are the implications of the criteria just discussed? First of all, they imply 
that for Epicurus there is no such thing as skepticism, for our senses, our being, and 
the world of nature do provide us with concrete and valid knowledge. Second, the 
emotions are recognized  as primordial in our experience and understanding of the 
world; whatever is considered true can only be so as long as our perception of pain 
and pleasure is carefully scrutinized. The combination of the availability of concrete 
natural phenomena and the human capacity to guide human behavior on the basis of 
the relationship between pleasure, pain and the world, clearly gives the individual a 
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fair amount of autonomy.  Furthermore, as observed by some Epicurean scholars, 
reason is not part of the criteria just mentioned.  In the consideration of each criterion 
Epicurus uses the same formula; it is by virtue of their being  in contact with concrete 
reality that they are chosen. It is because of this contact that they “exalt nature over 
reason as affording a norm of truth.”47 Reason can subsequently be looked at as a 
function subservient to the primal data captured by our senses, instead of an activity 
from which all reality  and affirmation emanates. Concrete nature sets the standard of 
concepts, not the other way around. 
There are other opinions which are characteristic of and in line with the 
Epicurean views just discussed that should also be mentioned. Amongst them are the 
beliefs that the world is made of atoms that gather together and dissipate in the void 
infinitely, that life only lasts so long as such association of atoms exists; that once 
they dissipate life is no more; that the gods exist and are also made of atoms, that 
they are perfectly happy and undisturbed, that they do not have any involvement in 
the origin of the cosmos (the cosmos has always existed) nor do they intervene or are 
interested in human affairs. 
But how does Epicurus’ philosophy permit the achievement of moral self-
sufficiency?  It is clear that Epicurus’s system is conceived with the purpose of 
allowing each person be the architect of his own character, the hedonistic calculus 
teaches us that much. It is also conceived with the purpose of assigning the cause of 
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things within the world of atoms and not in a world beyond.  But all these teachings 
are incomplete if a practice does not accompany them.  By conceiving philosophy as 
an activity meant to help the individual get cured of unnecessary sufferings, Epicurus 
calls for detachment from commonly held values, and for the confirmation of the 
individual’s happiness on the basis of his or her own experience and application of 
reason. This is why, for instance, in his Letter to Menoeceus Epicurus highlights the 
importance of key concepts of his ethical theory - the groundlessness of fear of the 
gods and of death, the distinction between natural and unnecessary desires, the 
eminence of pleasure and its relationship to an undisturbed state, the hedonistic 
calculus, the confirmation that what is good is easily attainable - so that a student can 
exercise himself continually in the company of like-minded friends. Epicurean autarky, 
therefore, is possible by the developing of a theory which, as  Bernard Frischer 
remarks, is not based on the contemplation of an abstract notion “like the Good nor of 
the superlunary and superhuman cosmos, but of the human condition and 
achievement of human happiness”48 This theory, which contemplates practice, 
involves constant reflection on the value of the emotional with regards to pleasure, 
and gives rise to an individual who is constantly trying to act consciously and willingly, 
according to his or her own most personal and profound dispositions. The fact that 
this practice needs to take place in the company of like-minded friends makes the 
existence of a community essential for the attainment of a peaceful mind. The 
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Epicurean ethical doctrine advises a way life, that is, for its incorporation into the 
everyday life of each person in all aspects of life. 
Building an alternative community was an important aspect of Epicurus’ method 
to effectively treat the suffering of the human soul. As has been discussed, Epicurus’ 
teaching is based on the belief that the way of life promoted in the city is full of 
suffering primarily because of the values that most people assigned to things and the 
desires that ensued from them. 
Before Epicurus, as Hadot has correctly remarked, this critique of the way of life 
of the city was already in place, as we can see in Plato’s Apology. However, this 
critique was accompanied by the belief that the philosopher’s function was to 
contribute to the betterment of the  city. For instance, this is evident whenSocrates 
claims that by questioning people and making them aware of their ignorance, he is 
rendering the city the greatest service, or when the philosopher king is put as the 
head of the ideal city in The Republic. Aristotle, for his part,  believes that the city and 
the legislator were responsible for assuring  the virtuous life  and happiness of their 
citizens.49 As R. Bodéüs observes, for Aristotle the city and the legislator are 
responsible for creating the adequate context in which the necessary leisure is 
available for the philosophic life. Hence, one of the tasks of the philosopher consists 
in teaching  the political man and legislator about what makes for virtuous action and 
a virtuous life, so that a good political regime may be developed. Seeing that there is 
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an intimate relationship between politics and laws and the ethos of a people, it is not 
possible for Aristotle to develop an ethics detached from the city.  Thus Bodéüs 
argues that “nous ne pouvons croire à l’intention qu’aurait eue le Stagirite de fonder 
une morale individuelle, dégagée des exigences que pose à l’individu son 
appartenance à une Cité.”50 Furthermore, this inevitable political binding is reinforced 
by the observation that human beings are by nature political animals not only  
because they need to live in community, but also because their uniquely human 
capacity for reasoned speech and argument supports a particular form of political 
community.51  Because a community is above all a political one characterized by the 
type of rational understanding of life, the philosopher is most of all linked to the 
improvement of the regime of the city. 
For Epicurus, unlike Socrates, Plato or Aristotle, the role of the philosopher does 
not consist in improving the city by participating in politics or by educating politicians 
and legislators. Epicurus did not believe that it was necessary to participate in the 
political establishment to achieve a happy life. On the contrary, he discourages 
political participation on the basis that the political, as it is commonly seen in practice, 
is mainly concerned with the pursuit of power and wealth, not happiness or virtue. 
And even though Plato and Aristotle, as Hadot puts it, find in philosophy “a means to 
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free themselves from political corruption”52 Epicurus, on the other hand, abandons 
any interest in fighting corruption in the political establishment. If the political regime is 
unable to make a person virtuous, Epicureanism and its way of life provides an 
immediate and effective solution to the problem. By not dwelling on the hope that a 
city could be made better with the help of the philosopher, Epicureanism gives the 
individual tools to find his happiness by means of therapeutical philosophical 
discourse and a close community of friends.  It is precisely the avoidance of this hope 
that is intended when Epicurus tells us  μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι ("Do not engage in 
politics!"). According to Frischer this advice “can be understood as a reflexive reaction 
to the practical political failures and tragedies of philosophers from Pythagoras to 
Aristotle.”53 Hence,  instead of constructing an ideal state, Epicurus constructs an 
ideal individual by building a community where the philosopher can live the life he 
considers best without having to face the dangers other philosophers had to put up 
with by trying to make the city a better place. Hence, Epicureanism not only offered 
the necessary theory and practice for the individual to heal himself from unnecessary 
sufferings, but also offered  “the deracinated and alienated intellectual a home in a 
consciously constructed community that embodied a genuinely positive and legitimate 
alternative to the dominant culture of Greece.”54
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4. The Epicurean Garden
When considering the Epicurean community as an unusual alternative to the 
way of life of the city, there are other aspects which are of interest to us. For instance, 
even though foreigners, women, and slaves enjoyed equal rights with Athenian 
citizens in private religious associations55 (this is the legal status philosophical 
schools acquired in order to have protection from the state)  we don’t hear of other 
schools before the Epicurean one in which so many of these types of individuals were 
so widely accepted. We know, for instance, that two women attended Plato’s 
Academy,56 but apart from their names we don’t know anything else. In the case of 
Aristotle’s school we have no evidence of female pupils. In the case of Epicurus’ 
Garden,57 we know of several women who attended the school and also wrote 
different works. We know too that a great number of foreigners and slaves were also 
part of the community.58 
Furthermore, unlike previous schools, Epicurus encouraged the participants in 
the school not only to marry and raise children but also to live together in the Garden. 
Property was not held in common because Epicurus believed that having property in 
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common engendered mistrust and harmed friendship.59 This, in addition to Epicurus’ 
insistence on the importance of  living life regularly at the same time that 
philosophizing and laughing took place, presented those living in the community a 
very pleasant space where, as Firschner remarks, “all the normal activities of life took 
place alongside learning and study.” 60
It is also interesting to observe that as we have it from Epicurus’ will, the school 
property was not given to the Epicurean community but to Hermarchus, indirectly 
through Amynomachus.61 Seeing this, Firschner correctly states that the Epicurean 
garden did not have the legal status of a religious organization and therefore did not 
have the protection of the state. In order to be recognized as a religious group, the 
school property needed to be registered under the name of the community as a 
whole.62 What this implied, regardless of how impractical Epicurus’ decision could 
have been, is that the Epicurean community was not engaged in the worship and 
adoration of any deity, remaining, therefore, in line with their strong refusal of any 
superstitiously-inspired practice. 
The Epicurean Garden was a place where the most distinctive values of society 
were refused and  where very different ones were practiced. Not only did the Garden  
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welcome those individuals who did not have  favorable status in the city but also 
developed its own way of marriage, its own economic arrangement, and by their 
strong emphasis on friendship, its own system of justice. Concerning the latter, the 
community itself, with its new type of fundamental arrangements, was an actualization 
of Epicurus’ appeal to natural justice which “is a pledge of reciprocal benefit, to 
prevent one man from harming or being harmed by another.” 63 This pledge was 
certainly not  possible in the context of the regime of the city. In it, not being able to 
recognize the moderate bounds of nature’s wealth, men  toiled for small things and 
“incessantly [began] strife and war for gain.” 64  We know that for Epicurus, something 
that was no longer mutually advantageous could not be considered just,65 and as 
such it needed to be reconsidered.  Being convinced that such reconsideration was 
not possible within the actual political structure of the city, Epicurus decided to make 
such readjustments within the limits of his private property.  His insistence on the idea 
that “the man who best knows how to meet external threats makes into one family all 
the creatures he can; and those he can not, he at any rate does not treat as aliens”66 
could be interpreted as exactly that which the Garden represented in practice. The 
community was a place where the threats of false opinion and vain desire were kept 
in check without failing to pay respect to the traditions and norms of the city, by,  for 
example, encouraging involvement in state festivals.67
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Seeing that the Epicurean community was so revolutionary in the sense of 
offering an experience of life very distinct from the one offered elsewhere, that it was 
in direct opposition to the values of Athens, and that it was not protected by Athenian 
corporate law, then it appears more than necessary that strict carefulness in its 
dealings with the authorities and other Athenians was indispensable. It is clear why, in 
order to be able to practice such a radical and politically different way of life, 
Epicureans had to avoid political confrontations.  Political  participation was not only 
beyond their intention but also in opposition to their desired undisturbed state. 
So far we have discussed the ways in which the type of life Epicurus’ proposed 
was different, attractive and effective in helping the individual cure himself from the 
evils of false dogma and unnecessary desires. Evidently, from what has been 
discussed, the community was an essential component to the therapeutic goal of the 
Epicurean life. Political participation, we just concluded, was to be avoided for 
practical and spiritual reasons. However, in order to make sure this position is tenable 
we ought to take a closer look at the primary sources available, and see if we can add 
another level of understanding to this discussion. 
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5.  λάθε βιώσασ
Of the many Epicurean maxims concerning political withdrawal, the most 
significant comes in the form of  two words: λάθε βιώσασ or live unnoticed. It is a 
maxim that, although clear enough to be translated without major difficulties, needs to 
be interpreted against  specific premises of Epicurean ethical thought. 
Let us first make a few remarks concerning the maxim itself. First of all, λάθε 
βιώσασ is not found in the extant works of Epicurus; it has been passed to us through 
the work of Plutarch in an essay entitled Ει καλώς είρηται το λάθε βιώσας (Is the 
Saying "Live in Obscurity" Right?).   However, considering that the essay deals with 
the saying as directly quoted from one of Epicurus’ writings, it is reasonable to trust 
Plutarch and consider it as  veritable Epicurean maxim. Second, from the translations 
offered for these two Greek words, I have decided to follow the one proposed  by G. 
Roskam and other scholars for a number of reasons. First, λάθε βιώσας does not 
mean that the Epicurean sage should live in complete seclusion away from the city 
and society, a meaning that is possible by other translations such as Live unknown or 
Live in obscurity. Rather, as noted by Norman DeWitt, the maxim is to be translated 
as Live unnoticed. For Epicurus there are three causes of injury, namely, envy, hatred 
and contempt.68 For each one of these causes, there are extant texts which instruct 
the Epicurean sage to behave in such a way as to not inspire these feelings in 
68 Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, 2. 10.117.
others.69 For instance, in the case of contempt, the general prescription is extant: “As 
for reputation, the wise man will exercise just enough foresight to avoid contempt."70 
As is the case here and with the other two causes, Epicurus never tells his disciples 
to live in such a way as to not be known at all; instead, his advice is to avoid practices 
and actions which would call for unhappiness and hostility from fellow citizens while 
living with them. This and the fact that Epicurus’ Garden was located on the outskirts 
of the city would have made it very unlikely for its members to remain unknown. 
Instead, Epicurus’ prescriptions definitely make it easier to lead a life within the city 
with the least amount of distress and hostility from others. 
Again, for Epicurus, the actions of the individual should be focused on acquiring 
natural pleasure, which is only possible through ἀταραξία. It is for this reason that to 
understand the intention behind the advice λάθε βιώσας we should consider the 
criteria composing Epicurean ethical thinking. Another, no less important reason, is 
the fact that texts on Epicurean ethical thinking are extant and abundant. Considering 
these two points, Roskam’s analysis is of relevance and shall, therefore, be used to 
assist us. According to him, λάθε βιώσας should be understood against  three 
general components present in Epicurean  moral thinking.71  
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We have seen that Epicurus’ philosophy makes it clear that the major obstacles 
to leading a happy life are vain desires and false opinions.  As has been discussed, 
Epicurus’ philosophy is primarily soul-healing, and his arguments are therapeutic. 
This is evident in the advice found in Vatican Sayings 54 and 64. The former 
discourages the pretense of love and of the practice of philosophy, and argues in 
favor of their true practicing so that healing can become possible. The latter advises 
against wanting the esteem of others for the healing of ourselves instead. It is for this 
reason that the Epicurean student is not only expected to understand the doctrines on 
an intellectual level; he is also expected to internalize them by constant training, by 
meditation and even by learning them by heart.72 Hence, λάθε βιώσασ should be 
understood under the premises of Epicurus’ therapeutical objective and not merely as 
a theoretical principle. Its advice is practical, it is supposed to contribute to the soul-
healing process of those who follow it. 
Second, λάθε βιώσασ should be understood under the light of Epicurus’ 
distinction between the three types of desires distinguished in Epicurean thought. 
According to that categorization, the Epicurean student will only choose the first type 
of desires, which are limited and are easily fulfilled, and avoid the third kind, which are 
unlimited  and only attractive on the basis of vain opinions. As it happens, most men 
tend to choose the third kind, postponing  joy without ever considering that their time 
is limited.73 Roskam argues that the distinction between desires and the concept of 
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limitation connected with them is of great importance.74 Those who disregard the 
advice of our maxim will strive for fame, which is an “unlimited desire that is neither 
natural nor necessary”,75 postponing, therefore, the obtention of happiness to an 
uncertain future. Those, on the other hand, that live an unnoticed life remain within 
the limits of natural desire and can consequently enjoy the present. 
Third, the principle of rational calculus (συμμέτρησισ) previously mentioned is 
crucial to understand our maxim. In short, this calculus asserts that choice of desires 
should not be made on the basis of pleasure alone but on measuring the quantity of 
pleasure and pain present in either those things that are pleasurable or painful. 
According to Roskam this is important for two reasons. First, it explains that Epicurus’ 
advice is not based on personal taste but on rational arguments. In fact, lack of 
comparative judgment (ἀνεπιλόγιστοσ)  is as detrimental to happiness as is an 
excess in desires.76 Second, the calculus in question, so Roskam argues, helps 
explain why the maxim λάθε βιώσασ was not introduced in the Κύριαι Δόξαι or the 
Sententiae Vaticanae.77 Our maxim does not specify the context and the 
circumstances in which it should be applied. Without these, had the maxim been 
included, it would have had to be followed under all circumstances, an implication 
which  contradicts the nature of the calculus itself. This is why the Epicurean wise 
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man, reports Diogenes Laertius, “will pay court to a king, if need be” or “will take a suit 
in court.”78 Epicurus is clearly aware that at times it will be necessary to act politically, 
even though it is not recommended. 
In the fewest possible words, these three considerations tell us that the advice 
λάθε βιώσασ is essentially therapeutic and practical. It cures the soul from the pains 
of unlimited desires and keeps the Epicurean safe from unwisely dealing with politics. 
However, the advice is practical in another way. Roskam fails to notice that the advice 
to live unnoticed could also have been expressed as a practical caveat against being 
harmed on account of the intrinsic subversive values of the Epicurean way of life. In 
this perspective, political participation is troubling for the soul not only because it 
exposes one to the dangers of the pursue of power, fame or wealth, but also because 
the Epicurean, in his critique of the absurdness of such pursuits and of many 
important values of the mainstream tradition, could easily compromise his safety.
Three doctrines from the  Κύριαι Δόξαι dealing with the question of security are 
of great importance, for they bring clues concerning the motivation behind Epicurean 
social and political thinking.  Principle doctrines 6,7 and 8 deal with different ways of 
getting security: the first tells us that we can get it from “public office and kingship”, 
the second from being “famous and respected” and the third states that the purest 
security “is  that which comes from a quiet life and withdrawal from the many.”  
Roskam‘s translation of ἀσφαλείας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων as security coming from others 
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instead of the traditional translation security against others is of importance, not only 
because the grammar permits it but also because we find the same tenet in Lucretius' 
account of the rise of civilization, where he describes men banding together for their 
common security in order to overcome the dangers present in the state of nature.79 
This allows to place Epicurus’ political philosophy away from the claim that he is 
hostile towards political society; as we see here, this was not the case. 
Furthermore, Roskam’s translation coincides with the Epicurean belief depicted 
in Principle doctrines 31 and 38, which tells us that much security is to be gained  
through “laws and justice, which should be understood as a kind of contract aiming at 
mutual non-interference.”80 It also coincides with the idea that security can be 
obtained from other people, particularly friends.81 Furthermore, the fact that fame, 
political power and money are ways to achieve security through other people is 
pertinent and valid because they may in fact, at certain times,  offer some sort of 
protection from external harms. More importantly, by considering Principle doctrines 6 
and 7 as ways to achieve security from other men (as opposed to against other men) 
they avoid disagreement with Epicurus’  rational calculus (συμμέτρησισ) which does 
not permit to discard the value of things without measuring them against specific 
contexts. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the Epicurean would choose fame or 
political power as his or her favorite means to security. This is likely the reason why 
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Principle doctrine14 states that security that comes from a quiet and sequestered life 
is preferable to that which comes from other men. 
There are also other doctrines that deal with the issue of security. Principle 
doctrine 39 deals with the condition of the man who organizes himself best when the 
confidence that comes from external things is lacking. Epicurus’ recommendation is 
that in such cases one should try to make alike to oneself those things one can, while 
never making those, that one cannot, alien to oneself. If neither of these options is 
possible one should avoid all contact.  This suggests that a sequestered life is the 
preferable alternative “when nothing remains of the ἀσφάλεια ἐξ ἀνθρώπων” a 
situation in which other people are enemies who menace one’s security rather than 
contributing to it. Principle doctrine 40 describes a similar situation but from another 
angle, in which security is obtained from one’s neighbors. Following Roskam’s 
translation, this doctrine explains that one’s confidence is based on one’s neighbors, 
only then, (and not by means of political power or fame) “one can live pleasantly with 
the strongest guarantee.”82 Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the word 
ὁμορούντων used in this doctrine indicates Epicurus’ “characteristic focus on a 
confined circle of acquaintances, rather than on the scene of public life.”83 By bringing 
forth Principle doctrines 39 and 40 as well as translating them in his particular 
fashion, Roskam enables a reading of Epicurus in which abstention from politics  and 
public life is not an a priori rule applicable to everyone, but one that should be 
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followed in particular circumstances. Furthermore, if perhaps Epicurus’ advice to live 
an unnoticed life insinuates disdain towards other human beings, this is dissipated by 
his emphasis on the importance of neighbors as a means to live pleasantly and 
securely. If there is something clear about Epicurus position it is this: don’t participate 
in politics, for the moment you do there are great chances that the security one gets 
from one’s neighbors will be at stake. 
At this point, a distinction between security coming from one’s neighbors and 
security coming from other men by being involved in public life becomes evident. The 
latter, because of the dangers it entails, is disfavored in face of the former. But if this 
is clear, something else needs further clarification.  How does Epicurus’ clear 
preference of a sequestered life as a means to obtain security stand against the 
obtention of security from one’s neighbors (especially when the latter has also been 
described as the best)?  
It is hard to determine the meaning of the passage from Vatican doctrine 58 in 
which Epicurus says that “they  must free themselves from the prison of daily duties 
and politics.” Considering that the context is lacking, we should avoid thinking that 
Epicurus is referring to everybody in general. A passage from Plutarch tells us that  
“Epicurus does not think that it is necessary for the lover of honor and the lover of 
fame to be tranquil but to employ their nature in political participation and prosecuting 
public business because, given their nature, by not taking part in public matters they 
are harmed and disturbed more, if they do not obtain the things which they seek.”  
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This is a clear indication that in Epicurus’ view, though unrecommended, political 
participation is for some an unavoidable constituent part of their happiness. Given 
their nature, that is given their natural dispositions and particular contexts, they will be 
more unhappy if they refrain from this need. However, being what it is,  in their case 
partaking in politics will not lead to ataraxy. Diogenes Laertius tells us that “not every 
bodily constitution nor every nationality becomes wise.”84 Clearly, the happiness that 
Epicurus prescribes is not for everybody and depends highly on the nature, bodily 
constitution, and particular culture of each person. S. McConnell observes that it 
would be expected that Epicurean rational argument could cure everybody, but in 
practice Epicurus understood that sometimes the power of philosophical rational 
therapy does fail  “even though in theory there is always the chance that it will 
overcome the barriers presented by one's nature. And that’s why his advice to avoid 
political participation cannot possibly be addressed to everybody but only those who 
are naturally suited to practice his way of life.”85
Finally in Vatican saying 81, Epicurus is apodictic in saying that emotional 
disturbance won’t be banished by the “greatest wealth or respect from the multitude.” 
This, however, does not contradict what has been said in the previous analysis, which 
concluded that political power and fame could be considered a means to obtain 
security. What this entails, Roskam points out adequately, is that security does not 
necessarily imply tranquility of mind. Clearly, even those who have managed to find 
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security may still suffer from all sorts of irrational fears. With this in mind, it becomes 
clear that ataraxy can be achieved by appealing to different means, of which 
ἀσφάλεια is one. 
Now to come back  to the question of the relationship between security coming 
from one’s neighbors and  security from leading a sequestered life, Roskam asserts 
that Epicurus would prefer that the condition of ἀταραξία be reached by living within 
“a confined circle of neighbors” which still provides security, “far away from the 
multitude and political life.”86  Epicurus does not reject the possibility of participating in 
politics lest one’s security be at stake, but if the conditions of security are fulfilled, it 
seems that to reach his telos, one should take distance from political life and the 
desire of fame, and retire with like-minded friends to lead a sequestered life. To 
reiterate what was mentioned in the previous paragraph, ἀσφάλεια ought to be 
considered as a necessary condition to ἀταραξία, not a sufficient one. 
So far we have argued that Epicurus’ exhortation to live a hidden life is far from 
displaying a hostile intention towards society. On the contrary, as we have it from the 
extant texts, Epicurus carefully recommends his followers to be kind to those with 
whom they live.  In fact, the number of those who sympathized with him is said to 
have been so large that it “could hardly be counted by whole cities.”87   He is 
described as having been a man of great kindness, who was benevolent to all 
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humanity, faithful to his country, pious to the gods, loving of his parents, and who, as 
a consequence of the deference he had for others, abstained from entering public life 
and recommended those who followed his teachings to do likewise. Clearly, his dislike 
for the shortcomings of society does not imply hostility but kindness. In fact, there is 
no better way to live unnoticed than through kindness. Hostility even in the form of 
hidden disdain does draw much more attention. It has also been agreed that his 
advice is only to be applicable to each individual case, and if the rational calculus 
favors political participation, only then should one get involved in politics.  Also, it is 
clear that Epicurus understood that not everybody is suited to live an undisturbed life; 
evidently there are human beings who are far too convinced by the regular pursuits of 
society. In such cases, these people should let themselves act according to their 
nature.    These conclusions, though instructive in our understanding of Epicureanism, 
leave us with other important questions, which I should briefly try to address next. 
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6. Kingship and the best political regime
I have mentioned above that according to Diogenes Laërtius the Epicurean wise 
man “will pay court to a king, if need be (ὰπορήσαντα)” or “will take a suit in court.” 
So far, the position I have been emphasizing is that it is only in exceptional cases that 
political involvement is suggested. Gigante and Dorandi, on the other hand, argue for 
the opposite position by saying that Epicurus did in fact favor kingship.88 
 Their argument is primarily based on an emendation of Diogenes’ passage. By 
replacing ὰπορήσαντα by εὐρήρσαντα the text says that the wise man will make 
money as normal practice, but being well-resourced (εὐρήρσαντα) from his wisdom 
alone he will pay court to a king at an opportune time. The reasons why this is 
recommended, so they argue, is that first, it is the best way to secure material 
stability, and second, it allows the Epicurean to assist the king by giving him 
philosophical advice.89 Thus, binding these two interests in such a manner, the 
Epicurean would act in total agreement with the Epicurean tenet that states that the 
wise man will earn money by his wisdom alone. Consequently, they conclude, the 
Epicurean favored kingship without actually wanting to be king himself. 
88 M Gigante and T Dorandi, "Anassarco e Epicuro sul regno," Democrito e l'atomismo antico (1980).
89 Gigante and Dorandi, Anassarco E Epicuro Sul Regno: 486.
Based on Plutarch’s report concerning the Epicurean rejection of kingship,90 
Fowler argues against Gigante and Dorandi’s position. According to Plutarch, 
Epicurus was critical of political participation, claiming that an undisturbed life was 
much more valuable than the crown of a king, that there was no need to save Greece 
or be famous on account of one’s wisdom, for the most essential things were to eat, 
drink and avoid bodily harm. For Fowler Epicurus’ position could not be clearer; the 
Epicurean would not be king because such a position implies a life of disturbance, but 
he might be glad that “there was a king preserving the peace, and might well prefer a 
benevolent monarchy to a democracy, since in the latter he would be continually 
pestered by people like Pericles reminding him of his civic duties.”91Furthermore, 
even though Gigante and Dorandi’s emendation is ingenious, Fowler argues that the 
emended εὐρήρσαντα is redundant and “the connection between the maxims is 
overelaborate.”92 Besides, the link between ἐν καιρῷ (at the opportune time) and the 
original ὰπορήσαντα (when in need) are indicatives of things the wise man does not 
normally do but may be forced into by circumstances. Furthermore, Fowler supports 
his position by appealing to Lucretius' fifth book of his De Rerum Natura. There 
Lucretius narrates how kings arose naturally and built cities for their own security.93 
Before the discovery of gold, they would be fair to all their subjects, but after, their 
way of life was characterized by  a selfish concern for securing their own wealth by 
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fame or by force.94 Lucretius, therefore, is consistent with the Epicurean position 
known to us through Plutarch. Being king is a source of great disturbance, for it is a 
cause of disaster due to others' ambition and envy towards those with wealth, fame, 
and power.
The possibility that Epicurus could have favored kingship for the prospects of 
material security and the ability to live off one’s wisdom is made more unlikely by  the 
maxim λάθε βιώσασ. As argued above, the maxim is a straightforward exhortation to 
avoid political participation, because doing politics often implied a constant distress 
over power, wealth, fame and security. And this was true of both kingship and 
democracy; one only has to consider the example of Alexander the Great’s extensive 
conquests and  violent death. So long as the traditional understanding of politics was 
concerned, kingship falls within its limits, and any implication with it is discouraged. 
Dorandi and Gigante’s suggestion, like Fowler says, is at best not needed. 
There is no evidence to say that Epicurus favored any one type of political 
regime. But there is clear evidence that he discouraged political participation, that he 
considered traditional politics to be an area mainly guided by the pursuit of vain 
desires.  As it is, this could be understood as a veritable disinterestedness in the 
evolution and improvement of traditional politics. True happiness could never be 
possible if one tries to ennoble the political regime; the risks are simply too high. As 
discussed above, the fact that Epicurus understood that the pursuit of ataraxy was not 
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for everyone, that there are people whose happiness lies precisely in the pursuit of 
fame and power, and that they should be free to act as they wish, helps us 
understand that the existence of an Epicurean community at a universal  level 
including every human being is not possible. The Epicurean Garden was a community 
of friends committed to non-mutual harming and was simply unappealing to  all those 
who opted for the traditional type of life offered in the city. This relation between the 
disposition of people towards vain desires and politics  as the perfect means to attain 
them, is clearly an important reason to discourage all form of political participation. 
Only extreme situations involving danger would demand the Epicurean to step 
forward in the political arena, regardless of the political regime.   The type of evils 
politics breeds is inherent to it by the bias of those who see in politics the best means 
to acquire power, fame and wealth. If we have to find a political regime favored by 
Epicurus, there will be no other than the model  we find in the Garden, and that is, a 
community based on the principles of mutually advantageous friendship.  This is 
perhaps why Numemius, a non-Epicurean philosopher, describing the Epicurean 
school's success in living in such a good organized manner, speaks of it as being “like 
some true republic.”95 The Epicurean school was conceived not only as a school but 
as a place where the happy life could be lived. And this life was only possible by 
avoiding any stressful implication with the city that hosted the school. 
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7. Conclusion 
Epicurus’ avoidance of political participation is fundamentally an attitude aimed 
at accomplishing two major objectives. First, since the Garden was certainly at odds 
with the established order, avoiding political involvement helped prevent political 
persecution. Second, the apolitical attitude was consequential of the Epicurean 
pursuit of ataraxy; politics for the most part are filled with greed and other vain and 
strong desires, on account of which, any attempt at improving the regime was simply 
too dangerous.  Philosophy, as we learn from Hadot, is there to assist the individual in 
recreating himself, to allow him to question the values by which his way of life is being 
directed, and to facilitate the production of new ones instead. Epicurus’ effort to make 
this transformation attain its full potential is taken to a different level by the creation of 
the Epicurean community, a place where the uprooted philosopher could find the 
space to live his life without the thwarting oppression of a world overwhelmed by 
suffering, and the enjoyment of the liberty that one only finds among friends. To say 
that Epicurus’ advice was not politically motivated would be a serious 
misunderstanding. One of the most impressive achievements of Epicurean 
philosophy, and Hellenistic philosophy overall, is to have demonstrated how  social 
conditioning shapes emotion, desire and thought. Having come to the conclusion that 
the condition of things upon which life unfolded was not optimal, philosophers from 
this era sought to reform the social conditions which enabled such a state of affairs. 
Aristotle tells us that ethics is a part of politics, which is the most authoritative and 
architectonic science.96 Clearly, politics has the power of shaping the life of those who 
live in a political regime. Epicurus clearly understood this and saw that these type of 
arrangements are tremendously flawed, mainly because people who are part of it are, 
for the most part, uninterested in the well-being of the city as a whole. For Epicurus, 
humans do need to live organized according to a certain structure; the only difference 
is that for him, such organization cannot occur if it remains attached to the pursuits 
and struggles of traditional political life. Thus, politics conceived merely as the 
distribution of goods and offices is for Epicurus an outdated notion. Politics goes 
beyond the scope of material administration; it reaches, and deeply, the most intimate 
aspect of our souls. His refusal of politics is, therefore, apolitical only in the sense that 
it wants to cut loose from the leash of traditional values of accumulation and power. 
But in itself, Epicurus’ attitude wants to achieve almost the same thing that ideal 
politics do; namely, the well-being of each person, with the important difference that it 
does not aim to be universal. 
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